Introduction
This paper describes the legal regulations of political parties in Malawi and discusses the implications of these regulations for the way political parties function.
I first discuss what Malawi can be seen as a case of, including some contextual background information against which we must see the development of the Malawian polity. I then provide a brief overview of the structure of the political institutions in Malawi, followed by an overview of types of regulations that apply to political parties or to their functions.
The main body of the paper explains how the rules for registration of political parties and the structure of the political system impact on the development of the party system. In addition to the rules regulating the formation of parties, several legal acts, regulatory agencies and paragraphs in the constitution are relevant for three important functions of political parties: nomination of candidates, electoral campaigns and representation in parliament.
Malawi as a case.
Although the paper is a case study, Malawi is also an example of more general categories of political systems. First, Malawi is a case in a group of recently democratized countries in South-Eastern Africa. It shares with countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia a history of one party system and a transformation to multiparty elections in the early 1990's.
These countries also share a past as British colonies and have 'inherited' some constitutional features, which are important for how political parties are structured. In particular, the adoption of the first past the post electoral system for parliamentary elections impact on how parties nominate candidates and on how representatives relate to their constituencies, two functions of political parties strongly affected by public regulations.
On the other hand, Malawi, as other countries in the region, has adopted a strong presidential political system. As has been discussed by for instance Samuels and Shugart (Samuels and Shugart 2010) this type of institutional choice has implications for the nature of political parties. Presidentialism tends to "hinder parties' organizational development" (13). Malawi seems to confirm this hypothesis 1 . The new democracies in South-Eastern Africa are a subgroup of the general class of newly democratized countries. As a sub-group, the SouthEastern African democracies are distinct from many other new democracies in being economically less well-off than for instance new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
Economic variables are generally considered to be the most important predictors for democratic consolidation (Przeworski 1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998) . Malawi scores very poorly on many such indicators. Thus, to the extent that socio-economic factors are important for democratization in general, and by extension for the development of an institutionalized party system (Rueschemeyer, Stephens et al. 1992) Malawi faces an uphill struggle. Malawi's rank as number as number 171 of 187 countries on the overall Human Development Index for 2010 (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MWI.html)
captures the problematic socio-economic level of development.
Party system development in new democracies is also made difficult in a context of complex patterns of ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious divisions (Mozaffar, Scarritt et al. 2003; Cheeseman and Ford 2007) . Where there is an absence of a dominant ethnic group political leaders need to build alliances across groups, but with the absence of clear ideological dimensions, the party system is volatile. Malawi is clearly a case among such countries.
Regional divisions among the North, Central and Southern regions are many. Malawi has English as official language but not all Malawians have a command of English. According to Kayambazinthu (Kayambazinthu 1998) However, in terms of structure of the formal political institutions, the presidency and the parliament, there has been less change.
The most important political institution is the presidency. The president -and vice presidentis elected by simple majority in a nation-wide vote for a five year term and with a limitation of two terms for the same person. The constitution also provides for a second vice-president, to be appointed by the elected president. However, the second vice-president is an option available to the president, there does not have to be a second-vice president. The second vicepresident must be from a different party than the elected president and vice-president. The constitutional provision was made to accommodate a coalition between the UDF and AFORD (Alliance for democracy), the party based in the Northern Region. The Political Parties and Registration act specify the requirements to be fulfilled for those seeking to establish a new party.
The Malawi Electoral Commission Act, the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act, the Communications Act all contain elements impacting on political parties because the acts address functions that political parties perform 5 .
As will be made clear in the following, there are important interaction effects of the various rules: the primacy of the presidential office, the electoral system and the registration rules interact to fragment the party system. Similarly, the anti-defection clause of the constitution (Section 65) interacts with the ability of MEC to function. These formal rules in turn interact with the weakness of political parties as institutions. Political parties have elaborate formal organisations, which in practice do not function. The political parties are heavily dependent on the leadership. In addition, the absence of clear ideological differences between parties blurs the distinctions between them.
Overall, the combination of the formal rules, the selective application of the rules and the weakness of party organisation has not lead to the development of a stable party system.
Party system development and the registration of political parties.
During the two first elections (1995 and 1999) Malawi had a three-party system, based on a regional division. UDF dominated in the Southern region, which is also the most populous; the old state carrying party MCP (Malawi Congress Party) in the Central region and AFORD in the North. In the run-up to the 2004 elections, and following that election and in the years since, the party system has become increasingly fragmented. UDF won the two first presidential elections, but did not win a majority of seats in parliament (table 1) . Mutharika suddenly passed away due to heart failure. For a few days the country was at the brink of a political and constitutional disaster, caused by a previous rift in the governing party.
Although Malawi has a vice-president elected on the same ticket as the president, Mutharika fell out with his vice-president, Joyce Banda, because she and several fellow party members objected to the designation of Mutharika's brother as the party's presidential candidate for the next presidential election in 2014. She and her supporters were expelled from the party and the president tried every trick in the book to exclude her from any vice-presidential functions and tried to remove her privileges as vice-president. However, she could not be fired since she had been elected. While continuing to serve nominally as vice-president she formed her own party, PP (People's party), which quite unexpectedly became the current governing party when President Mutharika passed away, without ever having contested a single election.
At a formal level there has been a dramatic increase in the number of registered parties (table   2 ). The increase is at least partly explained by the splits that have occurred in each of the three • See appendix for party abbreviations.
The increase in the number of registered political parties is at least in part, explained by a combination of the structure in the political system and the ease with which to register a new 8 The first-past-the-post electoral system for the presidency means that it is sufficient with a plurality of the votes to be elected. Thus, the electoral threshold is low -and made lower the more competitive candidates there are. Ambitious politicians with some resources therefore have an incentive to defect from their parties if they lose the nomination battle. This is further aided by the extremely low threshold for registering a new party. Even if they do not succeed in winning the presidency, they may succeed in winning parliamentary seats and therefore become potential coalition parties (Rakner, Svåsand et al. 2007 ).
The Once registered, however, a party stays registered until it decides to dissolve itself according to its own statutes. The expanding number of registered parties reflects that many party initiatives remain on the books, although the parties fail to nominate a single candidate (see table 3 ).
Thus, the combination of three factors; the constitutional powers of the president, the firstpast-the post method for the presidential elections, and the ease with which new parties can be registered contribute to the increase in the number of parties.
Nomination of candidates
Although nomination of candidates is one of the central functions of parties in democracies, the parties do not monopolize the supply of candidates running for parliament. The constitution specifies conditions for individuals applying for registration as candidates, but do not say anything about parties per se. Parties are free to choose their own nomination method.
Even so, nomination issues frequently end up in the courts.
a. Candidates for the presidency.
As explained above, the presidency is by far the most important office to occupy and it is therefore a battle inside parties to capture the leadership position, and it is also therefore there is an increase in the number of parties.
The legal and administrative hurdles for candidates are small. Party nominated candidates must provide a signed document by an authorized office-bearer in the party conforming the candidate's status as that of representing the party. All candidate nominations must be supported by at least ten registered voters in each of the 26 districts of Malawi; hardly a difficult task to fulfil. More significant is probably the authority of the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) to decide upon a registration fee. Until the 2009 election this fee was Kw. 100.000 when it was increased to Kw. 500.000 (ca USD 3000).
b. Candidates for parliament.
The overall number of candidates for parliament has almost doubled over the four parliamentary elections, from ca. 600 to almost 1200. Second, the ease with which parties can be established means that many parties are 'briefcase' parties. They exist on paper, but do not perform the function of nominating candidates in more than a few constituencies.
Third, note the increase in the number of candidates running as independents, from a dozen in 1994 to almost five hundred in 2011. The increase is primarily due to inability of parties to establish and to implement a set of rules regulating the nomination process, but also no doubt, helped by the low threshold for registration. Thus, in each election there are numerous instances where defeated aspirants in the nomination process either take the party to court, or decide to run as independents. 14 Although the Malawi Electoral Commission is authorized to monitor and supposed ensure a level playing field, it has no authority to sanction MBC for failing to observe neutrality. But 12 Also newspapers must report on various parties' campaign. 
Political parties in parliament.
Political parties in parliament are regulated both by the constitution and by the standing orders of parliament. The constitution regulates the relationship between the MPs, the political party caucus and the voters through the so-called Section 65. The constitution also specifies that parties receiving at least 10 per cent of the national votes are eligible for public funding and that parliament regulates its own organization and procedures, the Standing Orders, some of which impact on parties.
Section 65: A case of complete failure?
Representation through political parties is a characteristic of modern democracies. In the political science literature parties are assumed to have advantages over other ways of organising the link between voters and representatives (Aldrich 1995) . Because representatives usually would like to be re-elected party control with the nomination process reduces the problem of agency loss (Przeworski, Stokes et al. 1999) . Thus, vertical accountability should be ensured in a political system where parties dominate the selection of candidates. Section 65 in the Malawi constitution is a paragraph meant to minimize the problem that elected MPs defect from the parties that nominated them which the plurality of voters voted for in the election. According to Section 65 the Speaker shall declare vacant the seat of an MP who voluntarily leaves the party he/she was elected to represent if he/she joins another political party. Thus, the rule does not apply to individuals who declare themselves independent, or MPs who have been elected as independents and later join a party caucus, or
MPs who are expelled from their party caucus. Nevertheless, Section 65 has been one of the most contentious issues in Malawi (Lembani 2007; Chinsinga 2010 ) and has not prevented defections. 15 Young, for instance, (Young 2009) Hence, the motivation to pursue the issue declined.
(temporarily) expelled from UDF when he unilaterally decided to join the MCP ticket as vice-presidential candidate. However, the UDF-MCP alliance became necessary when Muluzi, UDF's nominated candidate, was denied registration because he had already served two terms as president. Mpingjira was subsequently readmitted to UDF. When the PP became the governing party in April 2012 he again switched party affiliation.
In an almost complete re-run of the story, the sudden ascendance of Joyce Banda to the presidency in April 2012, and by default the PP as the governing party, created a rush among MP's to join the party. According to newspaper reports, by August 20, 2012, 110 MPs had joined the new party, primarily from DPP -to which Banda had also belonged -but also from UDF, AFORD and among independents. Not only MPs but also leading officers and politicians from other parties joined PP.
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Clearly, section 65 which was meant to ensure vertical accountability, has failed to constrain defections among MPs elected on a party ticket, and most defections are towards the incumbent party. One type of justification given by MPs when defecting is that they have 'consulted' their constituency supporters back home. Thus they claim they are responding to the demands of the grass-roots. Another often cited reason is that defection is done to attract more resources to their constituencies; thus in this way defection is a way of strengtheningnot weakening -vertical accountability.
Section 65 has been applied in a few individual cases, but it seems that when a 'tsunami' of defections occurs, there are many opportunities to delay taking any action until the next election approaches. As the outcome of by-elections is only valid for the remaining electoral term, the political parties have incentives to save resources needed for the approaching general election campaigns.
Party funding.
There are no limitations on campaign spending or any rules about how parties raise funds in general. consequences of party funding for party organization 17 , but it is likely that public funding has contributed to the centralisation of power in the parties as the funding is paid out the bank account managed by the party leader. As party finance in general is considered a well-kept secret it is not possible to know how significant public subsidies in general are. But inside political parties issues concerning finances are frequently a source of conflict. (Parties are not obliged to account for how the funding is spent). Thus, while public subsidies may strengthen political parties, it is also likely to increase leadership control with parties, given the weakness of internal party organization.
Standing orders of parliament
The Constitution gives the National Assembly the right to regulate its own organization and procedures. The standing orders do not regulate internal party affairs, but after the election in 
